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1 Recent Trends of Studies on The Subject 
1 happened to notice that references to“legal formality" or“legal 
formalism" recently have been increased than before， with some concrete 
analysis and contention in several articles or a part of book like D. 
Kennedy's， M. J. Horwitz'， R. M. Unger's， and others¥1) Since the late 
nineteenth and the early twentieth century， asit well known， severe criticism 
was made against the socalled conceptual or mechanical jurisprudence which 
may be considered as an extreme partner of “legal formalism" or “legal 
formality." If so， why reeent trends of criticism have newly appeared and 
what kind of treatments to this problem been made， must be worthwhile to 
consider. 
One possible course of its reasons and ways is to see in legal formalism or 
legal formality one of expressions enough to show predicaments law and 
legal theory being faced with in the modern society， touse Unger's term， the 
postliberal society， so that examination of formalism may lead to possible 
cure of such predicaments. What is done， atthe same time， by these attempts 
t This paper is a kind of summaryof the report which 1 made under the title: Form and Word 
in Law， atthe Conference of註leJapan Association of Legal Philosophy， Nov. 1976， and which will 
appear as an article on the Annual of Legal Philosophy published by this Association， 1977. 
* Professor of General Jurisprudence， Faculty of Law， Osaka University， L. L. D. Tokyo Uni暢
versity 1968. 
1) D. Kennedy， Legal Formality， 2 The Journal of Legal Studies 351，1973. 
M. J. Horwitz， The Rise ofLegal Formalism， 19 The American Journal ofL巴galHistory，251，1975.
R. M. Unger， Law in Modern Society， 1976. 
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is that an opportunity has been given to reconsider several different though 
interrelated aspects of the term legal formality or legal forma1ism through 
their examination. Below， 1 shal1 simply deal with a few problems， that is， 
complexed ways to use these terms， depth or scope of problems underlying 
them， and treatments directed to each different ways or aspects. 
I Complexity of Term of Legal Formality or Legal Formalism 
Some scholars pay attention to a significant difference of two aspects 
seen in using the term above. Unger marked off the most general sense from 
a narrower: “In the most general sense， formality means simply the marks 
that distinguish a legal system: the striving for a law that is general， 
autonomous， public， and positive. The idea of formality emphasizes the 
deeper motives that inspire this quest for govemment under law. -ー-A 
system of rules is formal insofar as it allows its official or nonofficial inter-
preters to justify their decisions by reference to the rules themselves and to 
the presence or absence of facts stated by the rules， without regard to any 
other arguments of faimess or uti1ity.一ー Ina narrower sense， formality is 
the willingness to al10w the rights and duties of the parties to be determined 
by the presence or absence of extemal solemnities 1ike the sea1. Both 
formality as rules and forma1ity as ceremony appear to make it possible to 
ascertain entitlements and ob1igations without evaluating the goodness or 
badness of particular resu1ts. "2) 
Such a difference， however， was noticed by D. Kennedy a 1it1e bit 
earlier. He stressed a meaning of“model of forma1ity" for ascertaining 
1iberal idea of justice in modem society by careful1y distinguishing it from 
another aspect of legal formality. Another aspect? It is quite simi1ar to 
Unger's in a narrower sense. He refered to it as fol1ows:“For example， the 
problem of formality in contract law can be conceived as that of the rela伺
tions between parties who have unanimously agreed to a set of rules， a judge， 
and those same parties appearing to challenge or defend the rules as they 
have worked out in practice. Likewise， one can approach the institution of 
2) Unger， supra note 1， at204f. 
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“procedural formalism" (the writ system， the Roman formula) and 
“formalities" (the seal， the Statute of Wil1s， recording statutes) as attempts 
to deal with the same fundamental problem of legal order."3) On the other 
hand， he approached to the problem of the model of forma1ity by recorト
structing“that version of the liberal theory of justice which asserts that 
justice consists in the impartial app1ication of rules deriving their legitimacy 
from the prior consent of those subject to them.円 4) The concept of 
formality according to him comes from three sources:“the contractarian 
political doctrine of Hobbes and Locke， the tradition of legal positivism 
from Bentham and Holmes through H. L. A. Hart， and the welfare economic 
analysis of writers 1ike J. S. Mil1 and Coase."の
We can trace back in history the jigsaw course of the sruggle for 
formality to control human conduct and for formfree principle of conduct. 
Common law tradition on formality， consideration， and equity in private 
law，6) or Roman stipulatio， legis actio and magistrate's， especially praetor's 
formulary system as law of edicts， and furthermore， process of settlement 
of disputes in the ear1ier period wil1 give us i1luminating examples. 
As to the case of the magicians， the prophets and the priests in the earlier 
period they want to get answer 介omabove， for instance God they believe 
in. In some sense they can get proper answer only if their question is 
properly， in other words， in accordance with certain formula required 
for this purposes made.7) Since magicians， prophets and priests in such 
cases are considered as charismatically qualified persons， their answer finding 
process， law finding process may wel1 be said irrational， though formal.ミAs
to the case of legis actio form is found in certain sterotyped words and 
3) Kennedy， supra note 1， at353. See also Kennedy， Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication， 89 Harvard L. Rev. 169lff.， 1976 
4) Kennedy， supra note 1， at351. 
5) Kennedy， supra note 1， at352. 
6) As 1 don't mention to Anglo・Americanexamples in this paper， see L. L. Fuller， Consid巴ration
and Form， 41 Columbia Law Review 799， 1941， and D. Kennedy， supra note 3， at1685ff. 
7) R. v. Jhering， Geist des romisch巴nRechts， zweiter Teil， zweite Abteilung， 1 Auf1.， 1858， 8 
Auf1.， SS. 398， 400. M. Weber， Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft， 4 Auf1.， besorgt von J. Winckelmann， 
1956， S.403 (below， S.means citation of German text's page). Max Weber on Law in Economy and 
Society， transl. by M. Rheinstein， 77， 1954. 
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gestures prescribed by lex，8) and lawfinding process here is formal as well as 
rational， insofar as it requires merely specialized but not extraordinary， 
that is， noncharismatic abi1ity for operation. As to the formulary system 
situation is a 1itle bit complex. On the one hand， use of formula as newly 
devised means resu1ts担 nonformalizationof， that is， deviation from the 
older civillaw tradition.9) Thus it is often said that Roman legal formalism 
was declined， then appeared here a tendency from ius strictum to aequitas. 
On the other hand， the new practice of praetors through edicts and formula 
becomes gradual1y to be uti1ized and adopted by praetors thereafter as 
means of trial instruction.10) Though in this respect more careful attention 
is to be paid to various aspects of the matter 1 don't go further at this time， 
the latter tendency means formalization of praetors' lawrnaking and lawfind-
mg process. 
Examples above show， despite of their each own different connotations， 
some common tendency to rely on any formal criteria. The more older 
forma1ity doesn't respond to actual necessity， the more newer nonformal 
practice is desired and realized. Nevertheless， formality in any sense doesn't 
vanish， and even after its decline， itseems to me， there emerges again and 
often new type of formality. Is this phenomenon， to use Unger's term， 
“circulation"， or a “spiral川 1)development? 1 think the latter is plausible. 
“Formal rationality" used above means according to M. Weber's c1asifi-
cation “formalism of the external characteristics" .12) But the course of 
historical development in the West (including emergence of an idea of body 
of law as constructed by legal scholars of the Glossing School in medieval 
Europe) and the capitalistic development there increasingly makes the law 
predictable， calculable in its function in both Continent and England， 
America， and yet formal rational in Continent in the sense of “formalism 
which use logical abstraction，" or that of “logical rationa1ity ."13) It may 
8) Gaius， Institutiones， 3・92，4・30.F. Schulz， History of Roman Legal Science， 20ff.， 1953. 
9) H. F. J olowicz幽 B.Nicholas， Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law， 199ff.， 
1972. Schulz， supra note 8， at50ff. J. P. Dawson， The Oracels of the Law， 10lff.， 1968. 
10) M. Weber， supra note 7， atS. 463ff.， p.213ff. 
11) Unger， supra note 1， at213f.， 238-241. 
12) M. Weber， supra note 7， atS. 397， and p. 64. 
13) M. Weber， supra not巴7，at S. 397， and p. 64， 63. 
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well be said from such historical perspective that law in the West， whether 
civil law system or common law system， has been conceived as a body of 
universalistic value. It forms the context which makes several ideas or 
ideologies possible like socalled legalism， the rule of law， and Rechtsstaat， 
etc. This also offers some means for the rise of its extreme partner， con-
ceptual or mechanical jurisprudence. Legal formality or legal formalism 
surely has been often understood in its c10sed connection to them， though 
there doesn't exist always necessary connection between both. In this 
respect 1 shall take a few examples about legal formalism in the modem 
period. 
M. J. Horwitz discusses legal forma1ism in the historical setting of 
nineteenth century America. According to him， legal writers or legal 
thinkers in the first ha1f of this century gradually show their formalistic cast 
of mind by giving an emphasis on the apolitical， scientific feature of 
common law rules in their Treatise Tradition against the Codification Move輔
ment. The legal forma1ism， atfirst merely a rethorical expression of this 
legal profession， then becomes every day categories of adjudication after 
1850， being combined with economic group interest at that time. It is 
worth noticing for characterization of legal formalism by Horwitz that 
“economic pressures towards uniformity and predictability， aswell as the 
efforts to restrict the scope of jury discretion， also u1timately contributed 
to this shift towards formal and objective legal rules. But it is important 
to see as well that this trend towards uniformity necessarily required 
doctrines of greater abstraction and generality， which in turn had the effect 
of --creating intema1 logical pressure to conceive of the law of contract 
as a system of disembodied logical interrelationships，川4)and that he pays 
14) M. J. Horwitz， supra note 1， at261. It is interesting to compare his analysis with M. Weber's. 
Weber se巴msto deal with English law from its each different asp巴cts，like through his discussion of 
common law， equity under the limited scope of private law on the one hand， and through his emphasis 
on considerable distance of the centra1 courts in which judges are contrasted withjuries who are con-
ceived as often tended to khadiiustice from the courts of justices of the peace on th巴other.1 only 
points out here that Horwitz' reference to “the efforts to restrict the scope of jury discretion"一
though it concerns with the American case -. seems adequately related to the problem of the ira-
tiona1 character of jury's function in English law so that it may be useful for further comparative 
understanding of Anglo-American law and legal th泊kingeven from M. Weber's perspective concerning 
the “England problem." 
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attention to“an intel1ectual system"1S) as that giving rise to legal forma1ism 
which may remind us lega1ism in the sense of J. Shklar. 16) 
From the view point of modern analytical jurisprudence H. L. A. Hart 
makes a remark on legal formalism. “The vice known to legal theory as 
formalism or conceptualism consists in an attitude to verbally formulated 
rules which both seeks to disguise and to minimize the need for such choice， 
once the general rule has been laid down. One way of doing this is to freeze 
the meaning of the rule so that its general terms must have the same meaning 
in every case where its app1ication is in question. To secure this we may 
fasten on certain features present in the plain case and insist that these are 
both necessary and sufficient to bring anything which has them within the 
scope of the rule， whatever other features it may have or lack， and whatever 
may be the social consequences of applying the rule in this way."17) 
Use of the term formal or formalism in the modern period or at present 
appears a bit different from the older (I shall cal for the convenience 
respectively the fbrmer the general sense， the latter the narrower according 
to Unger's usage). Whi1e a meaning of “formal" in the narrower sense stil 
remain within a scope， e.g.， of formula required by ceremony， therefore 
rathet conceivable， a meaning of “formal" in the general is often switched 
from the original or narrower， then it becomes necessary to grasp the latter 
in conjunction with its use in each different contexts. Here lies a problem 
of complexity or diversity of meaning of legal formalism in the modern 
It has been often said that Web巴r'sanalysis of English law is vague or ambiguous in regard to his 
famous frame of referenc巴“rationalization"of law in the West. Indeed the problem is how to under-
stand predictability or calculability of English law in connection with socal1ed“formal rationality" 
which means here logical1y formal rationality apart from “formalism of the external characteristics." 
1 think tentatively that Weber finds trends of desire for predictability of the Western law through the 
rising citizen or people deeply interested in the capitalistic development of society in Continent as well 
as in England， America， but logically formal rationality in the Continent. Further problems stil 
remaining here is whether or not dichotomy of formal (ir)rationality - material (ir)rationality 
serves as useful toul for analysis of the Western law， much les of law outside the W巴stwhich offers 
much irnportant task for our consideration. As to the England problem， see D. M. Trubek， Max Weber 
on Law and the Rise of Capitalism， Wisconsin L. Rev. 747f.， 1972， and D. Kennedy， supra note 1， at
358， supra note 3， at1721. As to the problem of law in the nonwest巴rnworld， see Trubek， Toward 
a Social Theory of Law， 82 Yale L. Journal 1， 1972. As to an outline of Horwitz' idea in the text 
above， see M. Yasaki， Formative Elements of American Legal Theory， 23 Osaka Univ. L. Rev. 2ff.， 
1976. 
15) Horwitz， supra note 1， at252. 
16) 1. Shklar， Legalism， 1964， lf. 
17) H. L. A. Hart， Th巴ConceptofLaw， 126， 1961. 
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period or at present. 
By the way， legal forma1ism in the general sense seems to be concerned 
with a larger scope of administration of law and legal thinking decisively 
influential to it. Horwitz' analysis on this point is ful of suggestions. It is 
certain that idea of the judicial process as a completely closed and contradic-
tionfree for the reason of authorization through state or of logical deductive 
method of legal reasoning is an oversimp1ified view of the process. 
Authorization of judicial decision through state authority doesn't gurantee 
appropriateness of its resu1t and deductive l]1ethod doesn't cover a whole 
dimension of judicial decision making process， because behind it (process of 
rationalization or va1idation) there is a process of discovery interwoven with 
judge's or participants' psychological or sociological factors. But it is stil1 
necessary， 1 think， to pay a careful attention to a significance of the aspect 
of rationalization or validation in the judicial process. As an example， let me 
cite Hart's notice on this matter. “The claim that logic plays only a sub-
ordinate part in the decision of cases is sometimes intended as a corrective 
to misleading descriptions of the judicial process， but sometimes it is 
intended as a criticism of the methods used by courts， which are stigmatized 
as“excessively logical，"“formal，"“mechanical，" or “automatic." Descrip-
tions of the methods actually used by courts must be distinguished from 
prescriptions of a1ternative methods and must be separately assesed."18) 
Forma1ity in the narrower sense， i.e.， formula required by ceremony， 
surely makes us feel somewhat troublesome as it requires us to take certain 
delimited type of conduct. It may often appear a kind of obstacles. With-
out certain means like formula， however， itis also true， we may feel difficult 
to control our various types of conduct in an accustomed routinework. 
Formality in this respect may remain a troublesome， but sti1 necessary 
means for our social1ife. It is certain that a framework of strict forma1ity 
was gradually undermined and overcome by “formfree" principle of various 
types in Continent as well as Anglo-American private law. Nevertheless， it
has been also recognized that under or behind such a new situation may 
18) H. L. A. Hart， Problems of Philosophy of Law， in: Encyclopedia of Philosophy， ed. by P. 
Edwards， 269r -270Q. 
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often appear a demand for certain regularized frame of reference to control 
private individuals， judges， and officials in their conduct which eventuaIly 
comes to be transformed into. desired or nascent formaIities as it was 
iIlustrated by the Roman and English law development and as it may well be 
symbolized by K. Marx' stimulating expression， legal “fetishism" .19) 
II Some Suggestions 
Letal formality or legal formalism as viewed from actuality of human Iife 
are perhaps difficuIt for us exhaustively to deny or abolish. Unger sets 
forth，“law is never purely formal， nor can formality ever vanish."20) But 
legal formaIity in either senses at present can't function by itself adequately 
for the pu叩oseof guarantee of people's freedom and right. Rise and decline 
of legal formality as deeply related to the formal rationality in the modern 
society was illuminatingly described by F. Neumann.21) Then what kind of 
treatment to this problem has been made? One suggested course was an 
emphasis on nonformal-Iaw applicatio，n， stiI les nonsterotyped law making 
apart from the older notion of the rule of law. In this respect Unger stresses 
significance and role of bureaucratic law and interactional or customary law 
in connection with equity and solidarity， within and outside blackletter 
law.2) It is an appealing idea to look at and treat the problem. Seen from 
historical point of view， however， such an idea seems interrelated with some 
preceding thinkers'， apart from their each own different connotations. It 
may be enough here to recall E. Ehrlich's idea (inner order of socia1 group or 
living law v. the authorized state law)，23) M. Weber's (formal rational law-
making and lawfinding v. material rationallawmaking and lawfinding， formal 
justice v. material justice)，24) C. Schmitt's (normativism， decisionism， and 
19) K. Marx， Das Kapital， erstes Buch， erster Abschnitt， erstes Kapitel， 4.
20) R. M. Unger， supra note 1， at205. 
21) F. Neumann， The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society， in: The Democratic 
and the Authorit釘ianState， 22ff.， 1957. 
22) R. M. Unger， supra note 1， at241， 205ff.， 48ff. 
23) E. Ehrlich， Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts， 1912. 
24) M. Weber， supra note 7. 
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idea of concrete order)，2S) so and so. The last problem 1 can't discuss 
furthermore is how to， and to what extent to reconcile these nonformalistic 
types (iふ， bureaucratic law and interactionallaw， or principles， standards， 
and policies，26) etc.，) with the socal1ed modem legal system or the rule of 
law notion in the changing society. 
25) C. Schmitt， Uber die drei Arten des rechtswissenscaftlichen Denkens， 1934. Cf. F. Neumann， 
supra note 21. 
26) Discussion about significance and role of principles， standards， maxims， and policies in 
modern 1巴galsystem， especially judicial decision making process appears to show another side of the 
same matter referred here. See R. M. Dworkin; The Model of Rules， 35Univ. of Chicago L. Rev. 14， 
1976. H. L. A. Hart， supra note 17， at128f.， and supra note 18， at2712. Dworkin， Hard Cas巴s，88
Harvard L. Rev. 1057， 1975. R. Sartorius， lndividual Conduct and Social Norms， 1975. K. 
Greenawa1t， Discretion and Judicial Decision， 75 Columbia L. Rev. 359， 1975. 1. M. Steiner， Judicial 
Discretion and the Concept of Law， 35 Cambridge L. Journal135， 1976 
